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Sleight of Hand or the Old Bait & Switch?:
Article III and the Politics of Self-Policing
by the Court in Parents Involved
ZANITA E. FENTONt
The arrogance of the Supreme Court continues to exceed itself. The
Court has manipulated precedent and ignored the fact that its ruling in
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1
oversteps its constitutional authority. The Court's unique interpretations
of even its most recent decisions in the area of education give new
credence to old perceptions that the Court interprets doctrine in outcome
determinate ways.' This is especially so after the Court's unfortunate
choice to adjudicate the election law case of Bush v. Gore.3 Separation
of powers may allow for overlap in the functions of the three branches
of government,4 but the Court seems to have the weakest check to
rebuke any overreaching of its own authority.5
The Court has the authority to interpret the Constitution and to have
that interpretation given deference. In both Marbury v. Madison6 and
t Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
1. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
2. See Mark Tushnet, Renormalizing Bush v. Gore: An Anticipatory Intellectual History, 90
GEO. L.J. 1 13, 113 (2001) (musing that Bush v. Gore has prompted the revitalization of Critical
Legal Studies).
3. 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see also Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between
Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1407 (2001) ("It is no secret that the Supreme Court's
decision in Bush v. Gore has shaken the faith of many legal academics in the Supreme Court and
in the system of judicial review.").
4. See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47- 48 (James Madison) (discussing separation of
powers).
5. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
6. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). Ever since Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court has
asserted the power of judicial review, applying the Constitution to cases. No part of the
Constitution expressly authorizes judicial review, but the Framers did contemplate the idea,
Alexander Hamilton wrote,
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A
constitution is in fact, and must be, regarded by the judges as a fundamental law. It
therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of any
particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an
irreconcileable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and
validity ought of course to be preferred; or, in other words, the constitution ought to
be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 379-80 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003). Nonetheless,
Article VI of the Constitution requires all public officials in the other branches of government to
"be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. The
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Cooper v. Aaron,7 the cases explicitly establishing such authority, the
historical contexts were ones where a Constitutional crisis was eminent
and where Court proclamation was necessary to avert that crises to
maintain our democratic form of government.8 The situation in Parents
Involved, however, is markedly different. In fact, despite the Court's
overriding of the popular will in Parents Involved,9 deference to the
Court is so ingrained as to minimize any possibility of crises.
Factually, Cooper was necessary to ensure that the entitlement of
Black children to an equal education was enforced by the states. 10 Doc-
trinally, it solidified the required deference to the courts on matters of
constitutional interpretation.' Ironically, the doctrinal propositions in
other branches of government have almost always respected the Court's interpretations, even
when disagreeing with them, on the premise that the Court's interpretations of the Constitution
have been in good faith. See Patrick 0. Gudridge, The Office of the Oath, 20 CONST. COMMENT.
387, 388-92 (2003) (discussing the relevancy of the oath of office to the constitutional
interpretations of each branch).
7. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
8. Checks on the Court's power have been relatively rare, precipitating instances of
"Constitutional Crises." See, e.g., id. at 4 (noting the refusal of Arkansas to comply with Brown v.
Board of Education); Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 576, 581-82 (J. Richardson ed.,
1897) (detailing Andrew Jackson's veto of the act to recharter the Bank of the United States in
1892); Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 6 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, supra, at 5, 8-10 (detailing Lincoln's
disagreement with Dred Scott v. Sandford, as expressed in his first inaugural address); William
Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807, 1823 (2008) (discussing Thomas Jefferson's
pardons of individuals convicted under the Alien and Sedition Acts); William E. Leuchtenburg,
The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing" Plan, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 347, 348-80
(discussing Franklin D. Roosevelt's "court packing" plan to ensure passage of New Deal
legislation). You might even consider the defiant refusal of President Andrew Jackson to enforce
the pro-Cherokee ruling of the Supreme Court in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832). Perhaps no Constitutional Crisis materialized in this instance because the Presidential
defiance maintained the racial hierarchy and status quo in much the same way that the Court
overturning the plans in Parents Involved maintains racial and class-based hierarchies and the
status quo. Cf. Zanita E. Fenton, The Paradox of Hierarchy-Or Why We Always Choose the
Tools of the Master's House, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 627, 634-36 (2007) (discussing
this idea's implication in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger).
9. When the "popular will" of the people, as represented in a properly elected legislative
body, is overturned by judicial action, it is referred to as the "countermajoritarian difficulty." See
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
PoLITIcs 16-17 (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962).
10. The Court held that, since Article VI made the U.S. Constitution the supreme law of the
land, and because Marbury gave the Supreme Court the power of judicial review, then the
precedent set forth in Brown v. Board of Education is the supreme law of the land, and is therefore
binding on all the states, regardless of contradicting state laws. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18.
11. See id. ("Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the 'supreme Law of the
Land.' In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the
Constitution as 'the fundamental and paramount law of the nation,' declared in the notable case of
Marbury v. Madison that 'It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is.' This decision declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been
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this context, set the stage for the current Court's bloating of its own
authority and enabled the Court to ignore, reinterpret, or mutilate its own
precedents 12 in overruling the democratically achieved education legisla-
tion by the Seattle School District in Parents Involved. 3
The arrogance of the Court, insisting on non-defiance of its educa-
tion decisions after Cooper, initially assisted civil-rights lawyers and
activists in their efforts to desegregate and achieve equal, quality educa-
tion for all school children. 4 That same arrogance now enables the
Court to insist on adherence to its decisions even when it does not fol-
low its own precedents and oversteps the spirit of the constitutionally
designed division of roles among the branches.1
5
The Court, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez, defined the structural parameters of education law, holding that
education is not a fundamental right and insisting that its regulation was
for local governments to determine. 6 Both of these doctrinal points
respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our
constitutional system." (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
at 177)); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power To Say What the
Law Is, 83 GEo. L.J. 217, 225 (1994); Gary Lawson, Interpretative Equality as a Structural
Imperative (Or "Pucker Up and Settle This! '"), 20 CONST. COMMENT. 379, 379-80 (2003).
12. In Parents Involved, Justice Breyer dissented:
The Court's decision undermines other basic institutional principles as well. What
has happened to stare decisis? The history of the plans before us, their educational
importance, their highly limited use of race-all these and more-make clear that
the compelling interest here is stronger than in Grutter. The plans here are more
narrowly tailored than the law school admissions program there at issue. Hence,
applying Grutter's strict test, their lawfulness follows a fortiori. To hold to the
contrary is to transform that test from "strict" to "fatal in fact"-the very opposite of
what Grutter said. And what has happened to Swann? To McDaniel? To Crawford?
To Harris? To School Committee of Boston? To Seattle School Dist. No. 1? After
decades of vibrant life, they would all, under the plurality's logic, be written out of
the law.
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2835 (2007) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
13. The Court in Cooper took the proposition in Marbury to the next level, not only assigning
the authority to the Court to interpret the Constitution in deciding cases, but further suggesting
that the Court is the ultimate authority on the meaning of the Constitution. Taken to its logical
extremes, Cooper would enable the Court to exceed or ignore any limits on its own authority.
Given the overall structure of the Constitution, it is unlikely that this was the intention of the
Founders.
14. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 529-30 (1980).
15. See Girardeau A. Spann, Neutralizing Grutter, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 633, 647 (2005)
("Cooper simply generates a self-referential paradox that is utterly unhelpful. If one believes that
the meaning of a constitutional provision is delegated by the Constitution to the political branches
of government, then Cooper is not only wrong, but political deference to Cooper would itself be
unconstitutional, as it would violate the doctrine of separation of powers by vesting policymaking
power in the wrong branch of government.").
16. 411 U.S. 1, 35, 40 (1973). Milliken v. Bradley, a case that was decided one year after
2009]
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demonstrate how the Court has done a constitutional disservice in Par-
ents Involved. The first because, though it was decided that education
was not a fundamental right, the range of decisions before and after Rod-
riguez acknowledged its import in exercising First Amendment free-
doms, as well as the privileges and obligations of citizenship. The
second because the Court's established structure respected vertical sepa-
ration of power,' 7 which was then disregarded by implication in Parents
Involved.
On the importance of education to citizenship and democracy, the
Court, in Brown v. Board of Education, points out that, "[t]oday, educa-
tion is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments. . . . It is the very foundation of good citizenship."' 8 Justice
Marshall, in dissent in Rodriguez, quotes Wisconsin v. Yoder 9 to con-
nect education to citizenship: "[S]ome degree of education is necessary
to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open
political system."2 Justice Marshall continued, "[E]ducation prepares
individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society."
21
Rodriguez, further clarified that local control of education was at the school-district level, not the
state-wide level, patterns of residential segregation notwithstanding. 418 U.S. 717, 746-52 (1974).
The Justices in Parents Involved spend some time discussing Milliken, which ensured that intra-
district remedies would not survive. E.g., Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2759 (plurality opinion);
see also Sean F. Reardon et al., The Changing Structure of School Segregation: Measurement and
Evidence of Multiracial Metropolitan-Area School Segregation, 1989-1995, 37 DEMOGRAPHY
351, 361 (2000) ("Suburbanization in itself, however, does not explain all of the increase in the
share of segregation due to segregation between districts. Increases in between-district segregation
are probably caused, at least in part, by persistent inequality in access to housing markets,
particularly suburban housing markets."). Justice Breyer also makes a similar point in his Parents
Involved dissent:
Beyond those minimum requirements [established in Brown], the Court left much of
the determination of how to achieve integration to the judgment of local
communities. Thus, in respect to race-conscious desegregation measures that the
Constitution permitted, but did not require (measures similar to those at issue here),
this Court unanimously stated:
"School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to
formulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude,
for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic
society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white
students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this
as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of
school authorities."
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2801 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)).
17. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
18. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
19. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
20. 411 U.S. at 112 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221).
21. Id. (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221). Justice Marshall goes on to connect education to
First Amendment rights by quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, discussing the right of students "to
inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding," 354 U.S. 234, 250
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More recently, in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court acknowledges "the
overriding importance of preparing students for work and citizenship,
' 22
citing Plyler v. Doe, 23 as well as Brown. Grutter goes on to state that
"[e]nsuring that public institutions are open and available to all segments
of American society, including people of all races and ethnicities, repre-
sents a paramount government objective" 24 and "[e]ffective participation
by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation
is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.
25
These arguments in Grutter were so prominent that one might have
thought it was going to overrule Rodriguez and affirm that education is
indeed a fundamental right; but that thought proved to be too hopeful.
The acknowledgments in these cases may not have been sufficient
to establish a fundamental right to an education, but certainly should
have been sufficient to assert a compelling governmental interest in Par-
ents Involved and survive strict scrutiny. 26 As discussed in Grutter:
"Strict scrutiny is not 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.' Although all
governmental uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not all are invali-
dated by it."'27 Nonetheless, Chief Justice Roberts, for the plurality in
Parents Involved, determined that the asserted interest in diversity was
not compelling.
Justice Roberts decided that, in the Grutter holding, the adjective
(1957), and Keyishian v. Board of Regents, calling the classroom the "marketplace of ideas," 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967). Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 112 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
22. 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982)).
23. 457 U.S. 202.
24. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331-32 (alteration in original).
25. Id. at 332.
26. See Spann, supra note 15, at 640-41; cf Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 225-27 (1995) (overruling the use of intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny in affirmative
action).
The problem is not that the Supreme Court always invalidates affirmative action
programs. Rather, the problem is that the Court thinks it can tell the difference
between an affirmative action program that is constitutional and one that is
unconstitutional.
Any affirmative action program that the white majority voluntarily adopts
through the political process should be upheld under the Constitution because there
is no reason to distrust the political process with respect to benign affirmative
action. But that is precisely the argument that the Supreme Court rejected in
Adarand, holding that even benign affirmative action was subject to strict equal
protection scrutiny.
Spann, supra note 15, at 640-41; see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2817 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Context matters when reviewing race-
based governmental actions under the Equal Protection Clause.... Not every decision influenced
by race is equally objectionable, and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for
carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the government
decisionmaker for the use of race in that particular context." (alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326)).
27. 539 U.S. at 326-27 (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237).
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was more important than the noun. That is, the holding in Grutter could
only be understood to support diversity in higher education, not just
education.28 By this stance, the Court necessarily ignores the realities of
the paths to higher education and the situations of real people. It is ludi-
crous to imagine, in a current society segregated by both race and
class,29 that diversity in higher education could ever be meaningfully
attained without significant attention to the early and middle stages of
educational opportunity.3°
Grutter and its companion case of Gratz v. Bollinger31 are regarded
as cases providing benefit to a very narrow class of individuals32 and
28. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2754 ("In upholding the admission plan in Grutter,....
this Court relied upon considerations unique to institutions of higher education, noting that in light
of 'the expansive freedom of speech and thought associated with the university environment,
universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition."' (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at
329)). Roberts's reading of Grutter, a case that on its own does little to advance the goals of
affirmative action, is such a great manipulation of the holding as to amount to a complete
disregard of it as precedent. At least, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, Justice Rehnquist was up-front
with his disregard of precedent: "[W]e always have treated stare decisis as a principle of policy,
and not as an inexorable command . . . . [T]his Court has never felt constrained to follow
precedent." 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S.
106, 119 (1940)).
29. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV.,
RACIAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF SEGREGATION 15 (2006), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/RacialTransformation.pdf ("Growing
segregation of black and Latino students from white students is a basic educational trend. But
there is another large and more encouraging development-the emergence of multiracial schools
on a large scale.... Whites are by far the students least likely to attend such schools-only about
an eight (12 percent) of whites do."); Reardon, supra note 16, at 359 ("[Tlhe largest single
contributor to total metropolitan segregation is segregation of white students from members of
other groups between city and suburban districts.").
30. Justice Breyer's dissent in Parents Involved, supports this position:
Finally, I recognize that the Court seeks to distinguish Grutter from these cases by
claiming that Grutter arose in "'the context of higher education.'" But that is not a
meaningful legal distinction .... I do not believe the Constitution could possibly
find "compelling" the provision of a racially diverse education for a 23-year-old law
student but not for a 13-year-old high school pupil .... [O]ne cannot find a relevant
distinction in the fact that these school districts did not examine the merits of
applications "individual[ly]." The context here does not involve admission by merit;
a child's academic, artistic, and athletic "merits" are not at all relevant to the child's
placement. These are not affirmative action plans, and hence "individualized
scrutiny" is simply beside the point.
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2829 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (fourth alteration in original)
(citations omitted).
31. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
32. See Daria Roithmayr, Tacking Left: A Radical Critique of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT.
191, 192-93 (2004) ("The small-scale affirmative action programs adopted by law schools
produced few material gains for most people in communities of color. We knew that in most elite
schools, diversity programs admit relatively small numbers of students. We acknowledged that
diversity-oriented programs concealed the racial bias of ostensibly race-neutral standards. And
from experience within our own institutions, we were painfully aware that the diversity rationale
2009] SLEIGHT OF HAND OR THE OLD BAIT & SWITCH?
providing hope for the achievement of equal opportunity in education
while simultaneously minimizing any realistic possibilities of such.33
Parents Involved heightens this structural dynamic. Rather than facilitat-
ing equal educational opportunity, Parents Involved creates greater bar-
riers to it.34 Professor Derrick Bell's assessment in his seminal article,
Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,
was as appropriate now as when it was written in 198035: "[T]he Court
has increasingly erected barriers to achieving the forms of racial balance
relief it earlier had approved."36
Not only did Justice Roberts indicate that diversity was not a com-
pelling governmental interest in primary school education, but he also
found that the scheme of the Seattle School Districts was not narrowly
tailored to meet it. In making these arguments, Justice Roberts has the
apparent audacity to equate the legislation and factual context in Parents
Involved to that at the time of Brown.37 Historically, the contexts are
permitted institutions to claim that they were 'for affirmative action,' without having to make a
commitment to eliminating the legacy of past discrimination." (footnotes omitted)). There are also
indications that this decision was only intended to assist individuals as a secondary proposition.
See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our
Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 117 (2003) (describing Grutter and Gratz as "the
latest and perhaps most significant evidence that race-based affirmative action was at risk until the
business community, the military brass, and educational leaders rallied in its defense").
33. Girardeau A. Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 221, 249 (2004)
("In a sense, Grutter and Gratz may present the worst of both worlds for racial minorities. They
leave open the possibility that affirmative action will sometimes be constitutionally permissible,
thereby preventing racial minorities from becoming too unruly. But under the prevailing
standards, truly beneficial affirmative action programs will rarely be upheld in reality. That is not
a bad strategy for continued racial oppression."). See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (investigating how much
social change the judiciary can create).
34. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2833 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("At a minimum, the
plurality's views would threaten a surge of race-based litigation. Hundreds of state and federal
statutes and regulations use racial classifications for educational or other purposes."). It seems that
similar fears of the administration of law on a case-by-case basis are precisely what animated the
result in Brown, given the trajectory of cases like Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), and
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
35. See Bell, supra note 14, at 526 ("[R]ecent decisions, most notably by the Supreme Court,
indicate that the convergence of black and white interests that led to Brown in 1954 and
influenced the character of its enforcement has begun to fade.").
36. Id. at 527.
37. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2768 (plurality opinion) ("Before Brown,
schoolchildren were told where they could and could not go to school based on the color of their
skin. The school districts in these cases have not carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that
we should allow this once again-even for very different reasons. For schools that never
segregated on the basis of race, such as Seattle, or that have removed the vestiges of past
segregation, such as Jefferson County, the way 'to achieve a system of determining admission to
the public schools on a nonracial basis' is to stop assigning students on a racial basis. The way to
stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." (citation
omitted) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955))). Earlier in his
opinion, Chief Justice Roberts suggests that Justice Harlan's invocation of a "color-blind"
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remarkably different,38 yet this decision ensures they will remain the
same.
39
Justice Roberts's understanding of narrow tailoring is in disagree-
ment not only with the four Justices in dissent, but also with multiple
lower court judges.4" The breadth of disagreement on this point is an
indication that the political process is better suited than the Court to
Constitution is the standard to which we should hold all uses of race. Id. at 2758 n.14. This
reading of how and why schools are segregated is blind to the structural inequalities, previously
supported by enforcement of law, that have enabled residential and educational segregation to
continue. Justice Stevens responds in dissent as follows:
There is a cruel irony in the Chief Justice's reliance on our decision in Brown v.
Board of Education. . . . The Chief Justice fails to note that it was only black
schoolchildren who were so ordered; indeed, the history books do not tell stories of
white children struggling to attend black schools. In this and other ways, the Chief
Justice rewrites the history of one of this Court's most important decisions.
Id. at 2797-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation and footnote omitted). Justice Thomas, in
concurrence, also takes issue with this point.
For at least two reasons, however, it is wrong to place the remediation of
segregation on the same plane as the remediation of racial imbalance. First, as
demonstrated above, the two concepts are distinct. Although racial imbalance can
result from de jure segregation, it does not necessarily, and the further we get from
the era of state-sponsored racial separation, the less likely it is that racial imbalance
has a traceable connection to any prior segregation.
Id. at 2773 (Thomas, J., concurring). Even Justice Kennedy is not willing to join in the opinion
that forecloses benign uses of race in equal protection. See id. at 2791-93 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
38. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975) (discussing the struggle
behind Brown).
39. See Roithmayr, supra note 32, at 203 ("In the public school finance feedback loop, non-
white neighborhoods with poor tax bases produce under-funded schools. In turn, underfunded
schools produce non-white neighborhoods with poor tax bases, because poorer schools produce
graduates with less income and wealth. Likewise, white neighborhoods with good tax bases
produce schools with good funding, which in turn produce a good tax base. In addition, because
property with good schools costs more than property without, non-white residents are less able to
move to a neighborhood with good schools.").
40. A panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, ruling on the
federal constitutional question. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 377
F.3d 949, 964, 969, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd en banc, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), rev'd,
127 S. Ct. 2738. (determining that, while achieving racial diversity and avoiding racial isolation
are compelling governmental interests, Seattle's use of the racial tiebreaker was not narrowly
tailored). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted rehearing en banc and overruled the panel
decision, affirming the district court's holding that Seattle's plan was narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest. Parents Involved, 426 F.3d 1162, 1192-93 (en banc), rev'd,
127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007); see also Spann, supra note 33, at 242 ("In [Grutter and Gratz], the
Supreme Court has adopted a position that is truly curious. It has rejected the polar extremes of
prohibiting all consideration of race, or of allowing the express pursuit of racial balance. Instead,
it has in effect adopted the position that race can be considered as long as five members of the
Court do not think that race has been given too much weight. It is striking that the Justices would
conclude that the Supreme Court was institutionally more competent than the policymaking arms
of American culture to decide on appropriate uses of race, given the Court's historical record on
the issue." (footnote omitted)).
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handle this matter.41
In an area where democracy has such obvious import,42 it is unfor-
tunate that the Court does not give greater deference to the legislative
process by a body to which the Court itself (in keeping with Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment) explicitly accorded authority to determine
matters in education: local government.43 In fact, "Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment establishes that questions about the policy prudence
and the constitutional validity of affirmative action are questions that, in
Marbury terms, are 'in their nature political.'" Unfortunately, the
Court's choice to counter the majoritarian political process is most pro-
nounced in the area of education and similar areas prone to societal
discrimination.45
Professor Girardeau Spann has been the most consistent in assert-
ing that the political process is more appropriate to determine the bound-
aries of affirmative action.46
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contained the substantive
equal protection guarantee, and Section 5 authorized Congress to
enforce the provisions of Section 1 precisely so that the Supreme
Court would not invalidate such remedial efforts on constitutional
grounds. The Fourteenth Amendment, therefore, was designed to
authorize political remedies for racial discrimination, and to give fed-
eral remedies primacy over state "Black Codes" that had officially
legislated the inferiority of blacks. Nothing in the history of the Four-
teenth Amendment can plausibly be read to authorize the Supreme
Court to invalidate state or federal political enactments that are
designed to enhance the status of racial minorities. Rather, Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes that questions about the
policy prudence and the constitutional validity of affirmative action
41. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2833 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I do not claim to know
how best to stop harmful discrimination; how best to create a society that includes all Americans;
how best to overcome our serious problems of increasing defacto segregation, troubled inner city
schooling, and poverty correlated with race. But, as a judge, I do know that the Constitution does
not authorize judges to dictate solutions to these problems.").
42. See supra notes 17-25.
43. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 43 (1973).
44. Spann, supra note 15, at 637 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 170
(1803)); cf Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 166 ("[T]o act in cases in which the executive
possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their
acts are only politically examinable.").
45. See Spann, supra note 33, at 232.
46. See, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Inaction, 50 How. L.J. 611, 658 (2007)
("When the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to the minority set-aside plan in Adarand, the
Court effectively invalidated a legislative program that had been adopted by Congress pursuant to
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather than defer to the judgment of the representative
branches, the Adarand Court instead overruled an earlier Supreme Court decision in Metro
Broadcasting v. FCC, which had expressly recognized that Congress possessed special affirmative
action powers emanating from section five of the Fourteenth Amendment." (footnotes omitted)).
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are questions that, in Marbury terms, are "in their nature political. 47
If we consider the historical treatment of Congress's Section 5
power to enforce the provisions and spirit of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,48 it has never fulfilled its promise as case law has been inconsis-
tent with the legislature's ability to interpret Section 1 to provide greater
protection for individual rights.4 9
In general, the Court only seems to care about separation of powers
in certain circumstances. It has no problem acting as referee in conflicts
between Congress and the Executive;50 it steps in to define the limits of
authority for the other branches;5 it forcefully establishes and defends
its own authority and province,52 and is especially protective of its own
province in determining positive uses of the Fourteenth Amendment.53
In the area of education, it not only has established a hierarchical struc-
ture for interpretation 5 4 but also a hierarchy of who determines any
47. Spann, supra note 15, at 637 (footnotes omitted).
48. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was one of the post-civil war
Reconstruction Amendments intended to ensure rights for former slaves. It provided a broad
definition of citizenship, superseding the Dred Scott ruling, which excluded Blacks from
citizenship and its benefits. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 n.15 (1999).
49. See, e.g., Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726-28 (2003); Bd. of Trs.
of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-74 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62, 80-83 (2000); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529-36 (1997); Robert C. Post &
Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison
and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 456-73 (2000).
50. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding a unicameral congressional
veto to be unconstitutional as violating both the bicameralism principles and the presentment
provisions of Article H); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (striking down the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act as an unconstitutional usurpation of executive power by Congress); Clinton
v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998) (holding that the line-item veto as granted in the
Line Item Veto Act of 1996 impermissibly gave the President the power to unilaterally amend or
repeal parts of statutes, violating the Presentment Clause of the Constitution).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712 (1974) (holding that the President.
cannot use executive privilege as an excuse to withhold evidence that is "demonstrably relevant in
a criminal trial"); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 489 (1969) (determining that judicial
review was appropriate in deciding whether Congress could exclude a person duly elected
pursuant to the U.S. Constitution from serving in Congress); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88 (1952) (limiting the power of the President to seize private
property in the absence of either specifically enumerated authority in Constitution or statutory
authority conferred by Congress); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
319-20 (1936) (establishing executive supremacy in foreign affairs and national security).
52. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch)
137, 177 (1803).
53. See, e.g., Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 726-28.
54. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2798-99
(2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the Court's interpretation of scrutiny); Spann, supra
note 15, at 639 ('The Court has continued to invalidate affirmative action programs adopted by
the political branches whenever those programs do not comport with the Court's own conception
of sound racial policy.").
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solutions.55 By burying itself in a set of rules the Court itself created, the
Court is able to hide in the illusion of maintaining limits on its own
power, yet it refuses to see its own hand in disturbing the balance of
power even as it seems willing to destabilize its own doctrines to enforce
this hierarchy.56
Popularly elected officials should settle questions when there is no
certainty, not the Supreme Court.57 In fact, the two branches other than
the judicial should interpret the Constitution more expansively than does
the Court.58 Cooper is defended as a means of settling questions that
need to be settled.59 Parents Involved does not enjoy that same status
because it confuses more than it settles.6 °
55. This applies not only to this case, but also to education and affirmative-action decisions
generally. See Adam Winkler, The Federal Government as a Constitutional Niche in Affirmative
Action Cases, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1931, 1931 (2007) ("[F]ederal courts often appear to apply a
more deferential form of strict scrutiny to the federal government's use of race.").
56. See supra notes 14-27.
57. See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999) (discussing the problems with judicial review of the Constitution).
58. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1227 (1978) ("But the force and meaning of this revised view of
the legal status of judicially underenforced constitutional norms can best be assessed by
considering what.., will change in our legal system if we adopt it. The most direct consequence
of adopting this revised view is the perception that government officials have a legal obligation to
obey [the] underenforced constitutional norm which extends beyond its interpretation by the
federal judiciary to the full dimensions of the concept which the norm embodies. This obligation
to obey constitutional norms at their unenforced margins requires governmental officials to
fashion their own conceptions of these norms and measure their conduct by reference to these
conceptions. Public officials cannot consider themselves free to act at what they perceive or ought
to perceive to be peril to constitutional norms merely because the federal judiciary is unable to
enforce these norms at their margins.").
59. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1359 (1997). The limitations on this view are suggested by the mere fact
that it is up to the judiciary to decide that which needs to be settled. On the margins, this gives the
judiciary too much unintended power. Parents Involved is one such case. Cf Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1, 22 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Violent resistance to law cannot be made a
legal reason for its suspension without loosening the fabric of our society. What could this mean
but to acknowledge that disorder under the aegis of a State has moral superiority over the law of
the Constitution? For those in authority thus to defy the law of the land is profoundly subversive
not only of our constitutional system but of the presuppositions of a democratic society."); Edwin
Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 989 (1987) ("[W]e must understand
that the Constitution is and must be understood to be superior to ordinary constitutional law. This
distinction must be respected .... To do otherwise, as Lincoln said, is to submit to government by
judiciary.").
60. Cf Meese, supra note 59, at 984 ("Perhaps the most well-known instance of this denial
occurred during the most important crisis in our political history. In 1857, in the Dred Scott case,
the Supreme Court struck down the Missouri Compromise by declaring that Congress could not
prevent the extension of slavery into the territories and that blacks could not be citizens and thus
eligible to enjoy the constitutional privileges of citizenship. This was a constitutional decision, for
the Court said that the right of whites to possess slaves was a property fight affirmed in the
Constitution." (footnote omitted)).
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It is notable that one of the most famous criticisms of Cooper is
that of former U.S. Attorney General and conservative scholar, Edwin
Meese, in The Law of the Constitution:
Once we understand the distinction between constitutional law and
the Constitution, once we see that constitutional decisions need not
be seen as the last words in constitutional construction, once we com-
prehend that these decisions do not necessarily determine future pub-
lic policy, once we see all of this, we can grasp a correlative point:
constitutional interpretation is not the business of the Court only, but
also properly the business of all branches of government.6 '
There is much irony in taking a position from the left criticizing
legislation by the Court.62 But the fact is that there is no franchise on
constitutional interpretations and criticisms. The Court's positions on
issues seem directly correlated to the predominant ideological stance on
the Court,63 especially as the Court recently has become more conserva-
tive.' Where the objectives are more in line with conservative ideology,
the current Court is much more willing to step outside of its own clear
authority to satisfy a particular outcome. A ready example of this trend
is Bush v. Gore.65
Bush v. Gore is an especially apt comparison with Parents
61. Id. at 985. Of course, only in a footnote does Mr. Meese concede that the outcome and
holding in Cooper were correct: "I emphasize that my criticism is aimed at the dictum of Cooper,
not the holding, with which I am in complete accord. Furthermore, in my judgment, officials in
Arkansas and other states with segregated school systems should have changed those systems to
conform with Brown." Id. at 987 n.25.
62. It is typically understood to be a conservative value to prefer a limited role for the
judiciary. See, e.g., Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 641, 648 (1990) ("Conservative constitutionalists tend to support two basic principles of
constitutional interpretation: first, that interpreters should defer whenever possible to the
originally intended meaning of the Constitution's drafters, and second, that judges should defer,
whenever possible, to the will of legislators."); Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism:
Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 634-37 (1994)
(noting that judicial restraint is central to judicial conservatism); cf CAss R. SUNSTE'r, ONE CASE
AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 24-45 (1999) (promoting a minimalist
judiciary). But see Alexander & Schauer, supra note 59, at 1362 (defending judicial supremacy in
constitutional interpretation).
63. Take, for example, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992), and the cases leading up to it. Some Justices in Casey were even willing to change its
standard of review to "undue burden," a more permissive standard to allow state restrictions on
individual freedoms. See id. at 874 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.). Yet, in
the education cases, the Court will not permit state fashioned remedies that do not explicitly
comport with the Court's own. The ability of the Court to pick and choose when it politically
promotes the ideals of federalism gives one pause about the proper extent of Cooper. See Winkler,
supra note 55, at 1946-48.
64. See Ernest A. Young, The Conservative Case for Federalism, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
874, 880-86 (2006) (attempting to define the amorphous contours of conservative ideology in
relation to federalism as a value).
65. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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Involved. In Bush v. Gore, the majority artfully avoided questions of
federalism, 66 separation of powers, 67 and prudential standing.68 It inter-
preted Article II so as to permit the Supreme Court to take the matter
from the state courts;6 9 simultaneously, it ignored the "safe harbor" pro-
vision in 3 U.S.C. § 5, which would have allowed jurisdiction by Con-
gress to determine any disputes in elections.70 The Court made an equal-
protection ruling that just as easily could have been supported by alter-
native proposition. 1 Most importantly, it took jurisdiction in a case that
compromised the appearance of impartiality of the Court in political
matters and reduced public confidence in the Constitution and rule of
law. This decision was counter to the majoritarian political process.72
Parents Involved follows the blueprint of the Court from Bush v. Gore in
66. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 452-86 (2002) (examining an exhaustive range of
federalism decisions by the Rehnquist Court and determining that the Court often proves more
substantively conservative, especially in the face of deference to state processes that would shield
liberal outcomes).
67. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
68. Prudential standing is the "judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal
jurisdiction." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Prudential standing may not be
specifically delineated in the Constitution but is necessary to maintain the spirit of the ideals of
separation of powers.
69. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 103 (per curiam) ("The petition presents the following questions:
whether the Florida Supreme Court established new standards for resolving Presidential election
contests, thereby violating Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution and failing to
comply with 3 U.S.C. § 5 .... "); Frank I. Michelman, Suspicion, or the New Prince, 68 U. CHI.
L. REV. 679, 679 (2001) (speculating as to whether there was a defensible basis for the Bush v.
Gore decision or if the majority was prompted by a preference for a Bush Presidency).
70. The "safe harbor" provision, 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000), allowed states to appoint their electors
without interference from Congress if done by a specified deadline. In 2000, the "safe harbor"
deadline was December 12, just one day after the case was argued before the Court. Bush, 531
U.S. at 121 (per curiam).
71. Critics of the decision pointed out that stopping the manual recount did not protect a
voter's equal-protection interests any more than actually doing the count. See, e.g., Michael J.
Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1721, 1728
(2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. CHi. L. REV. 757, 766 (2001). But see Nelson
Lund, The Unbearable Rightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 1219, 1243-51 (2002)
(arguing that Court made the proper decision in Bush v. Gore).
72. Bush v. Gore is defended as having been necessary to save the country from crisis. See,
e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION,
AND THE COURTS, 137-147 (2001). But see Elizabeth Garrett, Institutional Lessons from the 2000
Presidential Election, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 975, 975 (2001) ("When institutions must become
involved in majoritarian political decisions such as the selection of a President, it may be better to
rely largely on the political branches than on the judiciary for several reasons."). If there was no
need to prevent a crisis, there was not a Cooper-like situation and no need to test the bounds of the
authority of the Court. Some authors note that the decision was not unanimously decided, "but by
a 5-4 vote, with the majority consisting entirely of the Court's most conservative justices."
Sunstein, supra note 71, at 758. Self-policing by the Court to not take the case would have been
more appropriate. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 295-300
(2002); Garrett, supra, at 975; Peter M. Shane, Disappearing Democracy: How Bush v. Gore
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that it does not give deference to separation of powers, not even verti-
cally as established by the Court itself,73 and especially not horizontal
considerations explicit in the Fourteenth Amendment."4 Its ruling was
counter to the majoritarian political process that, but for inertia, would
be cause for civil unrest. However, unshielded from the glare on the
national stage, the Court in Bush v. Gore, unlike in Parents Involved,
was completely aware of its manipulations, as it states forthrightly that
the decision had no precedential value."
No one pretends that navigating separation of powers is easy, but,
given the nature of checks on the Court, the Court must be aware as to
when it is exceeding its constitutional bounds.76 Propositions from
Cooper are correct that there are times when it is the role of the court to
settle important social and political questions, but these times ought to
be exceptional. It is the role of the Court to create a structure in which
the legislative branches may operate, but not to usurp the political pre-
rogatives of Congress. As there is a need for the law to be flexible and
Undermined the Federal Right To Vote for Presidential Electors, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 535,
578-84 (2001).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
75. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 109 (per curiam) ("The recount process, in its features here
described, is inconsistent with the minimum procedures necessary to protect the fundamental right
of each voter in the special instance of a statewide recount under the authority of a single state
judicial officer. Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal
protection in election processes generally presents many complexities."). Instead of self-policing,
the Court in Bush v. Gore gives self-justifications:
None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority than are the
Members of this Court, and none stand more in admiration of the Constitution's
design to leave the selection of the President to the people, through their
legislatures, and to the political sphere. When contending parties invoke the process
of the courts, however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the federal
and constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced to confront.
Id. at Ill.
76. Recently, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), Justice O'Connor notes the need
for standards in determining how the Court should navigate close separation of powers questions
and suggests using the test articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Mathews dictates that the process due in any given instance is determined by
weighing "the private interest that will be affected by the official action" against the
Government's asserted interest, "including the function involved" and the burdens
the Government would face in providing greater process. The Mathews calculus
then contemplates a judicious balancing of these concerns, through an analysis of
"the risk of an erroneous deprivation" of the private interest if the process were
reduced and the "probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards."
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted) (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
Unfortunately, this test is messy and unlikely to be workable in all situations. Furthermore, this
test is almost as manipulable as none other.
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for precedents to change, the Court should prefer an honest overruling
rather than manipulations that confuse and can only be designed to
achieve a particular end.
